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frends and Problems in the Study of Political Development 
J3Y JOSEPH L. ARBENA 
cwmson University 
There are in the world in 197 4 almost 250 separate geographical 
entities, either countries or territories. Of these, the United Nations has 
classified 200, or roughly 80%, underdeveloped or developing. 1 Although 
many of these entities contain fewer than one million people, their com-
bined population is approximately 2.75 billion, or 73% of the world's 3.75 
billion people. 2 In a world still shrinking due to advances in communi-
cations technology, the presence of so many people living in circum-
stances which inhibit their human development continues to complicate 
the international political, economic, and strategic environment. It also 
continues to irritate the moral sensitivities and to stimulate the intellec-
tual curiosities of persons in the more developed regions. Surely the 
persistence of underdevelopment is one of the key dynamics in today's 
world. 
As a result, David Apter and S. S. Mushi could write recently that 
"social scientists are agreed that development is now a problem of uni-
versal concern," 3 a concern which dates , for several reasons, from the 
mid-1940s.4 The post-World War II decolonization movements through-
out the Third World brought to power leaders who not only wanted to 
serve their new nations, but who were under pressure to legitimize their 
rule by bringing benefits to their constituents. Besides, the only pattern 
of leadership which these rulers had to follow was the experience of the 
older nations-hence , the imitative effort to catch up or develop. 
This demonstration effect was enhanced by an acceleration in com-
munications which circulated world-wide a graphic image of material 
and institutional progress; millions became aware for the first time of 
what they did not have, leading to the oft-labeled revolution of rising 
1 Such classifications are, of course, subjective. For a brief summary of several 
widely used classifications of developing countries, see Adrian Moyes and Teresa 
Hayter, World III. A Handbook on Developing Countries (London, 1964) , p . 2. 
For an alternative, Marxist classification, see Pierre Jalee, The Pillage oj the Third 
World, trans. Mary Klopper (New York, 1968), p. 5. 
2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Demographic 
Yearbook: 1970 (New York, 1971). 
3 D. E. Apter and S. S. Mushi, "Political Science," International Social Science 
Journal, XXIV ( 1972), 48. 
4 According to L. J. Lebret, in Dynamique concrete du developpement (Paris, 
1957 ), p. 38, "the idea of development originates in 1945." 
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expectations. 15 Included, moreover, in this demonstration was the idea 
increasingly popular in the more developed nations, that science and 
technology could solve any human problem. Development, there fore 
required only the sufficient application of rational planning and tech~ 
nical know-how. Optimism, needless to say, ran high among leaders in 
all three worlds. 6 
Helping to spread both the images and the optimism were the 
United Nations and a variety of international agencies. These groups 
not only worked to alleviate and to overcome the problems of under-
development. They also publicized to a universal audience the great 
disparities in the world's standards of living. In so doing they both 
stimulated the less developed nations to seek a higher standard and 
encouraged the conviction that the existing inequities were an issue of 
moral concern. The development question, thereby, came to possess 
ethical as well as political and economic overtones. 7 
Finally, because of the atmosphere of the Cold War, strategic con-
siderations further intensified the universalization process. The Third 
World became an ideological battleground for East and West, as each 
sought to play on the discontent and aspirations of the underdeve loped 
through propaganda campaigns and the promise-not always ful£lled-
of foreign aid. In the new international game of numbers, the hope was 
to place one more country in "our column," or, at least, to prevent one 
from going into "theirs." If foreign aid did on occasion spring from 
humanitarianism, it was, nonetheless, convenient when humanitarian and 
strategic concerns overlapped. 
Initially, this interest in development focused mainly on economic 
problems, but as it became obvious that development was a more com-
plex form of social change than had originally been thought and as 
many Americans, under the pressures of the Cold War, easily confused 
economic and political concepts-the infamous Communism-democ racy 
dichotomy-the interest quickly broadened to include political and other 
considerations. 
Given the magnitude of these growing concerns it is not surpris ing 
that there was a parallel publication explosion. Although early theorists 
5 Anthony R. ObserschaJ.L "Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil," Journal 
of Development Studies, 6 (Oct. 1969), 5-22. 
6 For typical statements of the belief that development entailed spreading West-
ern values and could be achieved through proper planning and administration, see 
Eugene R. Black, The Diplomacy of Economic Development ( Cambridge, 1960) ; 
Clark Kerr et. al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (New York, 1964); and W. W. 
Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York, 
1962). 
7 Barbara Ward, The Lopsided World (New York, 1968), presents a highly 
moralistic appeal for aid for the underdeveloped areas. 
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS 147 
of social relationships, such as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Joseph 
Shumpeter, Max Weber, and Herbert Spencer, speculated about long-
range patterns of societal development, social scientists in significant 
numbers did not view development as a specific, delimited area of study 
until (again) about the end of World War 11.8 Arthur Kemp estimates 
that since that time the world's technical economic journals have con-
tained over 15,000 articles devoted in whole or in part to the questions 
of economic growth and development. This does not include books, nor 
articles in semi-technical and popular periodicals. 9 The extent of writing 
on political development and the politics of modernization may not be 
so great, but it is surely large and equally overwhelming. 10 
Apart from sheer quantity, the bulk of the political science litera-
ture of the post-war decades differed from earlier writing on develop-
ment in several important regards. Sidney Verba has summarized those 
trends: 
The revolution in comparative politics started with a number 
of brave principles: look beyond description to more theoretically 
relevant problems; look beyond the single case to the comparison of 
many cases; look beyond the formal institutions of governments to 
political processes and political functions; and look beyond the 
countries of Western Europe to the new nations of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America. 11 
It was those principles, emanating from the older and at that time nar-
rower field of comparative politics, which gave rise to the scientific study 
of development as a universal phenomenon. 
This rejection of the so-called traditional-institutional approach to 
comparative politics was, in fact, part of the larger behavioral movement 
which challenged the discipline of political science in the 1940s and 
1950s, and reached its peak in the early 1960s.12 Although probably mis-
named, behavioralism, in its broadest and most general usage, encour-
aged the application of scientific empiricism rather than intuitive or 
8 For an introductory discussion of the concepts of development and progress 
in Western thought, see Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History. Aspects of 
the Western Theory of. Development (New York, 1969). 
9 Arthur Kemp, 'Dimensions of Development: An Iconoclastic View," Modem 
Age, 16 ( Fall 1972), 398. 
10 Ralph Braibanti, "Comparative Political Analytics Reconsidered," Journal of 
Politics, 30 (Feb. 1969)., 25-65. 
11 Sidney Verba, 'Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research, World Politics, 
XX (Oct. 1967), 111. 
12 Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for 
a Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review, LV (Dec. 
1961 ), 763-772; Heinz Eulau , "The Behavioral Movement in Political Science: A 
Personal Document," Social Research, 35 ( Spring 1965), 1-29. 
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impressionistic techniques, objective rather than subjective perspecti ves 
inductive rather than deductive reasoning. Political behavior rep laced 
legal forms as the focus of study. Drawing on the methods of other 
social sciences, behavioralists began to look at both the role of the in-
dividual political actor and the relationship of all actors in the context 
of a total system. Ultimately, behavioralism looked to the construction 
of theory based on reality rather than on arbitrary standards of nor-
mality or morality. 
Another quality of the new development literature was that same 
optimism which characterized the thinking of politicians and planners. 
However, the optimism of the post-war era differed from earlier beliefs 
in inevitable progress based on the mechanistic operation of natura l laws. 
Disillusioned by the two World Wars and the Great Depression, theorists 
and planners alike now made development contingent on the intelligence 
and will of men rather than the inexorable wave of social evolution. 
Nevertheless, as Irving Horowitz has pointed out, "the development con-
cept at a significant level is a 20th-century equivalent of the 19th-century 
notion of progress. Development is a shared belief that men and nations 
not only change but somehow change for the better." 13 In short, the 
assumed bases for the optimism were different, but the faith in eventual 
success was the same. The clash between this native optimism and claims 
to scientific objectivity is obvious. 
But, as Gabriel Almond observed in 1969, "a mood of disillusion-
ment appears to be sweeping the field of comparative politics and po-
litical development." 14 This disillusionment stems, in part, from the fail-
ure of the various programs for development, applied with inconsistent 
vigor, to make an impact on rates of world economic and political im-
provement.15 It also stems from the fact that, at least as regards com-
parative politics and the study of political development, it has become 
evident in recent years that, despite their many contributions, the prac-
titioners of behavioralism have not really achieved the objectives implicit 
in their approach . Consequently, during the last five years, especially 
since we entered the "second development decade," much of the con-
ventional wisdom on all aspects of development has been subjecte d to 
13 Irving Louis Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development 
Decade," Studies in Comparative International Development, VII (Summer 1972), 
184. 
14 Gabriel A. Almond, "Determinacy-Choice, Stability-Change: Some Thoughts 
on a Contemporary Polemic in Political Theory," Government and Opposition, 5 
(Winter 1969-1970), 22. 
15 Lester B. Pearson, et. al., Partners in Development (New York, 1969). For 
a more optimistic assessment of the world economic scene at the end of the 1960s, 
see Eugene R. Black, "Development Revisited," Virginia Quarterly Review, 47 
(Winter 1971), 1-17, and Paul G. Hoffman, "Development Co-operation: A Fact 
of Modem Life," ibid. (Summer 1971), 321-335. 
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extensive criticism, modification, and, at times, outright rejection. 16 This 
is not to imply that development thinking was devoid of variations prior 
to the late 1960s. Rather, it suggests that in the mainstream of political 
science such variations were more a matter of degree than of substance. 17 
In the first place, despite an emphasis on scientific precision, there 
bas occurred, in Geoffrey Roberts' words, "a long-term debasement of 
political terminology," producing a "variety of unintegrated vocabularies 
of political language" and a "growing inability to communite." 18 Al-
though Roberts may be unduly cynical, it is undeniable that many inte-
gral terms and concepts in the field of development have no universally 
accepted or scientifically rigorous definition. "Conceptually the critical 
notions of capacity and differentiation and specialization are exception-
ally vague, if not tautological, in their referents and difficult to oper-
ationalize." 19 The same can surely be said of such idealistic forms as 
independence, freedom, and democracy, and of more delimited, yet 
popular, concepts such as traditionalism, stability, secularization, and 
political system.20 Not surprisingly, there is great inconsistency and im-
precision in the use of the concept of development itself.21 
Numerous authors, for example, insist that we apply the word de-
veloping, rather than backward or underdeveloped, to the countries of 
the Third World, because, they argue, all nations, including the more 
advanced, "are, or should be, developing, and no country is fully de-
1s A. R. Dennon offers a sweeping, though somewhat polemical, denunciation 
of development thinking in political science; see "Political Science and Political De-
velopment," Science and Society, XXXIII (Summer-Fall 1969), 285-298. A bitter 
critique of_ the last half century of social science literature, including the study of 
development, is found in Stanisfav Andreski, Social Sciences as Sorcery ( London, 
1972). For Andreski's own useful contribution to development thought, see Para-
sitism and Subversion. The Case of Latin America (New York, 1966). 
17 A. E. Keir Nash, "Pollution, Population, and the Cowboy Economy," Journal 
of Comparative Administration, 2 (May 1970), 109-128. For attempts to create 
taxonomies of post-war approaches to the study of political development, see Robert 
A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, 
XVII (Oct. 1964), 108-120; Chong-Do Hah and Jeanne Schneider, "A Critique of 
Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization," Social Research, 35 
(Spring 1968), 130-158; David E. Apter and Charles Andrain, "Comparative Gov-
ernment: Developing New Nations," Journal of Politics, 30 (May 1968), 372-416; 
Apter and Mushi, "Political Science." 
18 Geoffrey K. Roberts, "Com~arative Politics Today," Government and Oppo-
sition, 7 ( Winter 1972 ),, 49, and 'To Lift the Curse from Babel: The Need for a 
Language of Politics," it1id. (Spring 1972), 252. 
19 John Walton, "Political Development and Economic Development: A Re-
gional Assessment of Contemporary Theories," Studies in Comparative International 
Development, VII (Spring 1972), 58. 
20 For a penetrating critique of the concept of political systems, see S. E. Finer, 
"Almond's Concept of 'The Political System': A Textual Critique," Government and 
Opposition, 5 ( Winter 1969-1970), 3-21. 
21 In a widely-cited article, Lucian W. Pye analyzes ten frequently used defini-
tions of political development; see "The Concept of Political Development," The 
Annals, 358 (March 1965), 1-13. 
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veloped," inasmuch as development is an infinite open-en ded process.22 
Although this view is preferable to the older advanced-bac kward dich. 
otomy, it still assumes a process of linear movement and gives too little 
attention to the fact that all nations are not in the process of developing 
as, in recent years , some appear to be at best stagnating ( e.g., Colomb~ 
and Saudi Arabia), while others appear to be in fact regre ssing ( e.g. 
Uruguay and Nigeria). 23 Also, a few writers have of late introduced th; 
term overdeveloped to describe nations whose economies abuse their 
environments, whose institutions dehumanize their members, and whose 
bureaucracies no longer serve their clients.24 Of course, as Charles Tay. 
lor reminds us, not all significant political changes need be considered 
either progress or regression. 25 In other words, there is no agreement as 
to what developmen t-be it politica l, economic, social, or cultur al-really 
is and who is, or is not, actually developed. In fact , there is now no 
agreement among social scientists as to the possibility or even desir-
ability of development, at least not on the terms in which development 
has been most generally perceived .26 
Reflective of this confusion has been the inability to distinguish 
between politica l development as a distinct process and the development 
of other sectors of the social system. Helio J aguaribe, for example, main-
tains that "development is a tota l social process, and only for method-
ological convenience or in a partial sense can one speak of economic, 
politica l, cultural, and social development." By contras t, Taylor insists 
that "the first order of business in political development studie s is to 
isolate and give substance to the separate dimensions in political terms."27 
22 Pearson, et . al., Partners in Development, p. ix. 
2s The concept of regression is discussed by S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of 
Modernization ," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XIl (July 1964) , 
345-367, and Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 
World Politics" XVII (April 1965), 386-430. 
24 ash 'Pollution, Population, and the Cowboy Economy ." 
25 Charies Lewis Taylor, "Indicators of Political Development," Journal of De-
velopment Studies, 8 (April 1972), 108. 
26 For a caustic comment on the confusion in use of development and related 
terms, see Kemp, "Dimensions of Development: An Iconoclastic View," 399. For 
expressions of doubts about the future of development resulting from environme ntal 
and ethical considerations, see Herman E. Daly, "Trends in Economic Interpre ta-
tions in Latin America: The Shifting Balance among Neo-Classical, Neo-Marxist, 
and Neo-Malthusian Views," SECOLAS Annals, II (March 1971), 83-96; Warren 
Dean, "Economic Developm ent and Environmental Deterioration ," Studies in Com-
parative Development, VII (Fall 1972), 278-287; Edward J. Woodhouse, "Revi-
sionipg the Future of the Third World: An Ecological Perspective on Developme nt," 
World Politics, XXV (Oct. 1972) , 1-33. 
27 Jaguaribe , Economic and Political Development. A Theoretical Approach & 
a Brazilian Case Study ( Cambridg e, 1968) , p. 4; Taylor, "Indicators of Political 
Development," 108. Support for Taylor is found in J. P. Nettl and Karl von Vorys, 
"Th e Politics of Developm ent," Commentary, 46 (July 1968) , 59. Walton summa-
rizes the conflicting interpretations of the relationship of economic and political de-
velopment; see, "Political Development and Economic Development," 39-43. 
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Because there is no consensus on an objective definition of political 
development, the assignment of developed, developing, or underdevel-
oped ( sometimes modem, transitional, or traditional) status to a political 
system is, in truth, a function of individual , subjective preferences. Yet, 
there is a surprising consistency in the classification schemes employed 
by scholars using different working definitions, in that the same coun-
tries appear repeatedly in the same relative positions regardless of the 
tax:onomic criteria. These classifications, in turn, correspond quite highly 
to standard categories of economic development. Therefore, it seems fair 
to conclude that students of political development are not studying po-
litical development as an independent phenomenon, but rather the poli-
tics of nation-states that are relatively more or less economically and 
technologically developed or modem. The relationship is probably sym-
biotic rather than causal, though this remains unproven. Either way, the 
principal justification for a separate study of political development ap-
parently lies in the unique relationship of the political process to the 
broader milieu of underdevelopment. Even if they consider political de-
velopment to be a distinct and separate process, most students of the 
subject work from the assumption that political development is a "his-
torically identifiable set of political changes associated with the onset of 
industrialization in any given society" and that "some pattern of political 
modernization ... must inevitably accompany the process of social and 
economic modernization." 28 
Related to the lack of consensus on the meaning of development has 
been the post-war predeliction to formulate universal models of develop-
ment based on European and North Atlantic experiences and values.29 
Again, despite the commitment to culture-free objectivity, social scien-
tists internationally have worked from methodological and theoretical 
assumptions adopted often uncritically from the environment of the First 
and Second Worlds. The result has been a "problem of malanalysis based 
on general propositions without proper linkage with concrete data, of 
faulty generalizations, of inadequate mastery of data, of selecting the 
wrong issues, [and] of redundant repetition of accepted propositions." 30 
28 Roger W. Benjamin, et. al. Patterns of Political Development (New York, 
1972), p. 11; Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics 
(New York, 1971), p. 25. Marion J. Levy, Jr., begins with the assumption that "the 
measure of modernization [is] the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power." 
For a provocative and entertaining examination. of the comprehensive implications of 
the modernization process, see his Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors (New 
York, 1972). ( The quote is from p. 3n.) 
29 For examples, see Rostow, Th e Stages of Economic Growth, and A. F. K. 
Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York, 1967). More recently, 
Rostow attempted unsuccessfully to fuse the stage-theory approaches to political and 
economic development; see, Politics and the Stages of Growth ( Cambridge , 1971). 
so Syed Hussein Alatas, "The Captive Mind in Development Studies," Inter-
national Social Science Journal, XXIV ( 1972), 9-25. 
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Octavio Paz, Mexican essayist and critic, speaks for many in the less 
developed areas, when he laments that his country's development model 
"fails to correspond to our true historical, psychic, and cultural reality 
and is instead a mere copy ( and a degraded copy) of the orth Amen. 
can archtype. Again: we have not been able to create viable models of 
development, models that correspond to what we are." 31 He also cor. 
rectly describes a rising trend among social scientists in the nominally 
more developed areas when he observes that "not only capitalist devel-
opment but also the very notion of development has come under fire . ... 
In the East as in the West, the criticism of society that is taking shape is 
leading to a search for viable models of development different from those 
predominate today." 32 We must, Paz concludes, reject an approach "with 
more of slavish thoughtlessness in it than of scientific rigor." 83 
This should not be taken to mean that the prior experiences of older 
societies are of no relation to the development of newer ones . Talcott 
Parsons and the structural-functionalists, for example, have cogently ar-
gued the validity of comparing both common systemic needs and some 
broad developmental patterns in all or most modernizing societies.84 The 
concern is that "even if we do discover a configuration we can all 'indus-
tria l man,' or 'modem man,' the existence of such a con.figuration should 
not be permitted to obscure the important cross-cultural variati ons which 
exist simultaneously with the similarities." As F. Stirton Weave r has 
shown, through an examination of the Chilean case, "the change s in 
industrial arts and organization in the last two hundred years have so 
radically altered the social impact of industrialization that the applica-
tion of theories generalizing from earlier successful industria lization 
must be used with extreme caution in analyzing economic chang e in 
s1 Octavio Paz, The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid, trans. Lysander 
Kemp (New York, 1972), p. 73. Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian priest, boasts that 
"the poor countries are not interested in modeling themselves after the rich"; see, 
A Theology of Liberation, trans. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, 
New York, 1973), p. 22. Carlos Fuentes, another Mexican, contends that "we are 
different from you. Our problems are not your problems. We have to make deci-
sions and walk on roads different from those you believe to be universally valid"; 
see, "The Argument of Latin America: Words for the North Americans," Monthly 
Review (Jan. 1963), 502. 
32 Paz, The Other Mexico, pp. 143-144; Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of 
Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization," 130-158. 
38 Paz, The Other Mexico, p. 72. 
84 Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological 
Review, 29 (June 1964), 339-357, and Mark A. Tessler, ''The Application of West· 
em Theories and Measures of Political Participation to a Single-Party North African 
State," Comparative Political Studies, 5 (July 1972), 175-191; Ian Weinberg, "The 
Problem of the Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of 
a Theory," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11 (Jan. 1969), 1-15. 
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contemporary poor countries." 35 This caveat can surely be extended to 
models of political development as well. 
Disagreement also plagues the search for the analytical level on 
which meaningful generalizations can be constructed. This failure to rec-
ognize the most appropriate level is, according to Hah and Schneider, 
"the main methodological impediment to the progress of development 
studies." 36 If social scientists at one time anticipated the construction 
of explanatory and predictive models of development applicable to all 
nations and peoples, their efforts in that direction have been markedly 
unsuccessful: 87 "the general theoretical works float well above reality, 
and they often are so abstract as to suggest no clear problem focus." 38 
To counter this fault some theoreticians are suggesting an interme-
diate, or middle-level, approach based on segments of systems and sub-
sets of nations. 89 The problem then becomes one of selecting criteria for 
grouping. Lawrence S. Graham, contemplating the role of bureaucracies 
in the development process, proposes "the identification of distinct cul-
ture areas, beyond the confines of the individual states, where distinct 
perceptions and expectations . . . point to shared norms and values at 
the supranational level." 40 Applying such a standard, however, is harder 
than it sounds. Douglas Chalmers, for example, asserts the universality 
of an identifiable type of sociopolitical structure within the Latin Ameri-
can area and its distinctiveness compared with other parts of the world. 41 
85 C. Milton Coughenour and John B. Stephenson, "Measures of Individual 
Modernity: Review and Commentary," International Journal of Comparative Soci-
ology, XIII (June 1972), 98; F. Stirton Weaver, "Growth Theory and Chile: The 
Problem of Generalizing from Historical Example," Journal of Inter-American Stud-
ies and World Affairs, XII (Jan. 1970), 55-61. Leopoldo Zea, Mexican philoso_pher, 
suggests that the best model for the new nations of Africa and Asia might be found 
in the Latin American experience; see, Latin America and the World (Norman, 
1969). 
86 Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development 
and Modernization," 158. 
87 Roberts, "Comparative Politics Today," 55. 
38 Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," 112. 
39 Robert Burrowes, "Theory Si, Data Nol A Decade of Cross-National Political 
Research," W orl.d Politics, XXV ( Oct. 1972), 143. Additional comments on the need 
for middle-level conceptualization is found in Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories 
and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm," Comparative 
Politics, 1 ( Oct. 1968), 52-78; Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the Study 
of Government: The Sear~h for Focus," ibid., 79-90; Braibanti, "Comparative Poli-
tical Analytics Reconsidered." 
4 0 Lawrence S. Graham, "Projections for Future Research," Journal of Com-
parative Administration, 4 ( Aug. 1972), 258. 
41 Douglas Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America," Studies in Com-
parative International Development, VII (Summer 1972), 102-128. Chalmers has 
received support from Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the study of 
Political Change in lberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World Politics, 
tory, 11 (June 1969), 342-354. 
XXV (Jan. 1973), 206-235, and Edward J. Williams, "Comparative Political De-
velopment: Latin America and Afro-Asia," Comparative Studies in Society and His-
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In contrast, Charles Arnade and Eugene Genovese, both historians, con. 
tend that all or part of Latin America should be linked on a highe r level 
of analysis with other regions in the Third World. 42 Consequen tly, stu. 
dents of political development, whatever their regional specialty, can 
share in Henry Bienen's lament that "we have not been able to say what 
political development in Africa means or to decide whether or not 
we ought to mean something by 'political development' which is sui 
generis." 43 
If there is now a movement to postpone the search for universal 
theories, there is at the same time in some quaiters, as the above com-
ment by Graham implies, a desire to get away from the nation-sta te, in 
its comprehensive, systemic sense, as the primary unit of analysis . This 
is true, in part, because an emphasis on whole sytems makes meaning ful 
comparison very difficult; it also underscores the fact that many na tions 
are not homogeneous or highly integrated. Recognizing, therefore, the 
great disparities in wealth, values, and behavior among persons and re-
gions within individual countries, it seems useful to examine the devel-
opment role of a variety of environmental factors ( e.g., urbaniza tion 
industrialization, population, pollution and resource depletion) and so~ 
cial institutions ( e.g., businesses, bureaucracies, professional and occu-
pational groups) which either cut across national lines or exist within 
most countries and can be analyzed comparatively. 44 To achieve this, 
for example, John Walton has employed a "'standardized case compari-
son' procedure" to study subnational regions simultaneously within and 
across national boundaries. 45 At any rate, an emphasis on ecological vari-
42 Charles W. Arnade, "Recent Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa: A Com-
parison," SECOLAS Annals, III (1972), 37-43; Eugene D. Genovese, "The Com-
parative Focus in Latin America History," Journal of Inter-American and World 
Affairs, XII (July 1970), 317-327. Bruce M. Russett has discussed some quanti tative 
approaches to defining world regions; see, "Delineating International Regions," pp. 
317-353 in Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, ed. J. David 
Singer (New York, 1968). This disagreement is a reflection of the larger debate 
over the proper place of Latin American studies in the field of comparative politics; 
see, Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," pp . 
168-207 in Social Science Research on Latin America, ed. Charles Wagley ( New 
York, 1964); John D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Com-
parative Politics," Journal of Politics, 28 (Feb. 1966), 57-80; Martz, "Political Sci-
ence and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a Region,'' Latin 
American Research Review, VI ( Spring 1971), 73-99; Alfred Stepan, "Political De-
velopment Theory: The Latin American Experience,'' Journal of International Affairs, 
XX ( 1966), 223-234; Philippe C. Schmitter, "New Strategies for the Comparative 
Analysis of Latin American Politics," Latin American Research Review, IV ( Sum-
mer 1969), 83-110. 
43 Henry Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" World 
Politics, XX (Oct. 1967), 128-141. 
44 Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development Decade." 
45 Walton , "Political Development and Economic Development." See also, Ben• 
jamin, et. al., Patterns of Political Development, and Audrey C. Smock, Compara-
tive Politics: A Reader in Institutionaliwtion and Mobilization ( Boston, 1973) . 
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ables-including the world physical and biological environment-and 
international linkages is one of the important innovations in recent com-
parative studies. 48 
One theoretical outgrowth of these perspectives is the concept of 
structured underdevelopment which has gained considerable popularity 
in recent years especially among neo-Marxist economists and sociologists. 
,According to this view, underdevelopment, rather than being a given or 
natural state from which all societies evolve, is a product of the expan-
sion of the North Atlantic capitalist system and the establishment of a 
dependent relationship between the peripheral and metropolitan areas. 
While this dependency may be linked at one point to a colonial empire, 
it does not necessarily end with the demise of official colonialism. Under-
development, in other words, derives from the presence, not absence, of 
capitalism and other so-called modem institutions and values. In the 
political realm, underdevelopment is maintained by an alliance between 
those international forces and local elites which benefit from the status 
quo.47 
If this interpretation has any value, we are forced in turn to re-
evaluate the dual society thesis which pictures transitional societies as 
having a modem-urban sector and a traditional-rural sector, the latter 
resisting the spread of the former and thereby inhibiting development, 
which is tautologically defined as the decline of traditionalism . Recent 
investigations not only refute the basis of this dualism, but question the 
whole concept of traditionalism as the reverse of development. The corol-
lary theories of disruptive migrants and radical marginals also appear 
to lack empirical substance. 48 
411 James Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics. Essays on the Convergence of National 
and International Systems ( New York, 1969); Robert B. Stauffer, "Great-Power 
Constraints on Political Development,'' Studies in Comparative International Devel-
opment, VI (1970-71), 231-251; Richard Lee Clinton , "Portents for Politics in Latin 
American Population Expansion," SECOLAS Annals, III (March 1972), 70-83. Also 
see the last three articles cited in Note 26 above. 
47 Osvaldo Sunkel, "National Development Policy and External Dependence in 
Latin America," Journal of Development Studies, 6 (Oct. 1969), 23-48; Irving Louis 
Horowitz, "The Norm of Illegitimacy: Toward a General Theory of Latin American 
Political Development," Soundings, LI ( Spring 1968), 8-32; Henry Bernstein, "Mod-
errrization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development," Journal of Develop-
ment Studies, 7 (Jan. 1971), 141-160; Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial 
Heritage of Latin America. Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective (New 
York, 1970); John D. Esseks, "Economic Dependence and Political Development in 
New States of Africa," Journal of Politics, 331 ( Nov. 1971), 1052-1075; Immanuel 
Wallerstein, "Three Paths of National Development in Sixteenth-Century Europe," 
Studies in Comparative International Development, VII (Summer 1972), 95-101; 
Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America ( New 
York, 1967); Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment (Berkeley, 1964). 
48 H. W. Singer, "Dualism Revisited: A New Approach to the Problems of the 
Dual Society in Developing Countries," Journal of Development Studies, 1 ( Oct. 
1970), 60-75; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Erroneous Thesis About Latin America," 
pp. 102-117 in Horowitz, et. al., eds., Lattn American Radicalism (New York, 1969); 
156 JoUBNAL OF POLITICAL ScmNCE 
If the research of the post-war decades has not often been truly 
comparative, neither has it been truly developmental. What we have, in 
many cases, is actually comparative statics, the enumeration of succes-
sive stages and a contrasting of characteristics of each stage. How a 
system moves from one stage to another has been too rarely considered.49 
Even Gabriel Almond recently conceded the failure of his earlier Writ-
ings to treat this problem and formulated his own model of "develop-
mental episodes" to facilitate explanation of systemic change .50 Never-
theless, it will surely be a long time before we can determine if change 
is more likely to come dialectically, "in spurts, with definite ascertainable 
conditions," possibly accompanied by violence, 51 or through processes in 
which conflict, even where it exists, is incidental, and in which the cen-
tral pattern is cumulative, evolutionary, and continuous. 52 
A partial explanation of these shortcomings in political develop-
ment studies has been the frequent inability to transcend traditiona l dis-
ciplinary baniers-"interdisciplinarity is in the air, though it is more 
often preached than practiced." 53 For example, in a subject area which 
is by its nature implicitly historical, it is tragic that "political scientists 
seem to believe that history has no place in their discipline ." 54 Although 
that assessment may be less true today than it was five years ago, stu-
dents of development still approach the past with less precision th an 
they supposedly treat the present. 55 The absence of any explicit concep-
tion of time eliminates the possibility of constructing those developme n-
Mitchell A. Seligson, "The 'Dual Society' Thesis in Latin America: A Reexamination 
of the Costa Rican Case," Social Forces, 51 (Sept. 1972), 91-98; S. N. Eisens tadt, 
"Some Observations on the Dynamics of Traditions," Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 11 ( Oct. 1969), 451-475; Heinz Bechert, et. al., "Post-Traditio nal 
Societies," Daedalus, 102 (Winter 1973); Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without 
Breakdown: A Case Study," pp. 424-437 in Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. 
Adams, eds., Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America (New York, 
1965); Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing 
Societies ( Cambridge, 1969). 
49 Burrowes, "Theory Si, Data Nol" 125; Rudolf Rezsohazy, "The Concept of 
Social Time: Its Role in Development," International Social Science Journal, XXIV 
(1972), 26-36. 
50 Almond, "Determinacy-Choice , Stability-Change," 22-40 . 
51 Robert Nisbet, "The Military Community," Virginia Quarterly Review, 49 
(Winter 1973), 16; Richard 0. Nahrendorf, "Violence and Social Change," Soci-
ology and Social Research, 56 ( Oct. 1971), 5-18. 
r;2 Kenneth E. Boulding, A Primer on Social Dynamics: History as Dialectics 
and Development (New York, 1970). 
53 lgnacy Sachs, "The Logic of Development," International Social Science 
Journal, XXIV (1972), 37. 
54 Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development 
and Modernization," 158. 
55 Trowbridge H. Ford, "Towards a Better Relation between History and Poli-
tical Science," Government and Opposition, 1 ( Spring 1972), 207-228. 
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tal generalizations discussed in the previous paragraph. 56 This failure to 
achieve a comprehensive historical perspective also explains the confu-
sion of Western development experiences with those of the present Third 
World. 
History is not the only discipline from which, until recently, political 
scientists too often neglected to draw. If our earlier generalization is 
correct-that behavioralism provoked a dual interest in individual po-
litical actors and collective political systems-then the bulk of that in-
terest, at least in the Third World, has focused on the systemic rather 
than the individual level.57 This is basically true whether the focus has 
been national, regional, or universal. 
Although commendable advances have recently characterized the 
application of psychological and sociological insights to problems of 
political development, 58 many scholars continue to pay only lip service 
to the axiom that "it is the actors, rather than the institutions or the sys-
tems, that make the choices." 59 Institutions, systems, and their environ-
ments certainly set limits on alternatives and the methods of implemen-
tation, but that does not negate the importance of understanding how 
values and knowledge are acquired nor how choices are made. 60 
In sum, the parochialism of the practitioners of the various disci-
plines concerned with development has deprived scholars and planners 
alike of the balanced and integrated perspective that they need to prop-
erly do their jobs. 61 
Overarching all of these inter-related criticisms of postwar develop-
ment literature is the feeling that the concern of development studies 
56 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequence and Rates of 
Change," World Politics, XX ( April 1968), 495. Three important studies which do 
attempt to relate long-range historical patterns to theories of political development 
are C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History 
(New York, 1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York, 
1963); Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (London, 1967). For a re-
cent discussion of the difficulty involved in trying to establish sequential patterns in 
the development process, see Leonard Binder, et. al., Crises and Sequences in Po-
litical Development ( Princeton, 1971). 
57 Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development Decade." 
58 Apter and Mushi, "Political Science," 65-67; Coughenour and Stephenson, 
"Measures of Individual Modernity: Review and Commentary." 
59 Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies on Political Develop-
ment and Modernization," 145; Alatas, "The Captive Mind in Development Studies." 
oo A recent book by Taketsugu Tsurutani places welcome emphasis on political 
leadership as a crucial element in national development. However, the author prob-
ably carries his argument too far when he contends that any political leader is 
theoretically capable of bending any environmental circumstances to his own ad-
vantage; see, The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Tran-
sitional Societies (New York, 1973). 
61 George C. Lodge, The Case for the Generalist in Rural Development (Wash-
ington, 1969). 
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"cannot be simply with description, however complex," 62 but should 
give greater attention to human needs and values and be more directly 
related to feasible development planning for the actual achievement of 
a better life for the people still living in an underdeveloped state.63 
True, behavioral techniques have always carried with them the capacity 
to promote normative judgments and to encourage the forma tion of hu-
man values.64 There emerges the impression, however, that students of 
political development, in their devotion to scientific objectivity, have not 
been aware of the normative assumptions which underlie their own 
work nor willing to admit that their research, if only through the topics 
studied and methods employed, communicates certain value judgments. 
Undoubtedly, the prevalence of Western norms in post-war models 
designed for Third World development is not only a reflection of ethno-
centrism but also an attempt, subconscious or not, to keep things quiet-
'to keep the restless natives in their places'-for the protection of (most. 
often) American economic and security interests. 65 Hence, the emphasis 
on such concepts as stability and equilibrium, the preference for stag-
nation over violence, the acceptance of military regimes as reform agents, 
and, when the early post-war optimism went unfulfilled, a tenden cy to 
blame this on the institutions, mentalities, values, and supposed incap-
abilities of the Third World peoples and nations themselves rather than 
on the historic relationship between these nations and the developed 
areas of the world. 66 
62 Graeme C. Moodie and Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, "Means and Ends of Po-
litical Analysis," Government and Opposition, 5 ( Summer 1970), 286. 
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65 Western social scientists have dominated development studies since their be-
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If we assume that planners and "political leaders can be active 
agents in the process of making change," 67 then the research and the-
ories from which they draw will lead to decisions of considerable hu-
man importance: "development implies goals and the positing of goals 
requires values." 68 Research, in other words, is not carried out in a 
vacuum. As a result more writers are saying, with Mark Tessler, that 
''no theoretical discussion is worthwhile 'unless it provides, in addition 
to tentative explanations, realistic and practical answers to the question 
-what should be done next?' The construction of general theory should 
be only one of the preoccupations of the social scientist." 69 The scholar 
should continue to seek the ideal of scientific objectivity, but must like-
wise recognize his own assumptions and come to grips \.vith the practical 
consequences of his work.70 
This abbreviated survey of recent trends in development studies 
probably justifies Almond's reference to a mood of disillusionment.71 
Yet it remains a fact that, whatever development is, many people want 
it, for themselves or for others, and are often willing to go to great 
lengths to get it. Past failures to achieve precision in the study of de-
velopment or progr ess in the attainment of development should not dis-
suade us from further attempts at both, even though we have no guaran-
tee of success. Development remains an exciting field of intellectual 
inquiry and a pressing concern of international reality. 
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